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Abstract
The objectives of this paper are, first, to describe the developments in Chilean financial markets at
the macroeconomic level and, then, to examine their effects at the level of firms.  After reviewing
the main government policies towards financial markets in the last three decades, the paper
describes the remarkable changes and progress in the banking sector and in various types of capital
markets (bond, stock, pension and insurance markets) during the same period.  This is done by
evaluating changes in financial markets size, activity, and efficiency.  Second, the paper analyzes
the changes in both the access to financial markets and the financing (balance-sheet) decisions in a
sample of Chilean firms.  The sample consists of 79 firms that are quoted in the stock market and
for which annual balance sheet data for the period 1985-1995 are available and complete.  The
paper estimates and tests econometrically three issues.  The first is whether the firms’ reliance on
internal funds for investment has decreased in the more financially open period of the 1990s relative
to the 1980s and, thus, whether investment has been more responsive to changes in the q-value of
the firm.  The second examines whether financial liberalization and the development of the banking,
stock and bond markets at the aggregate level have affected the importance of debt relative to equity
and the maturity of debt in the balance sheet of firms.  The third studies the extent to which firm-
specific and aggregate financial market developments have impacted on firm growth, measured by
the percentage increase in operational revenues.  In general, we conclude that financial
developments at the macro level have indeed had an impact on the firms’ access to capital markets,
their financial structure, and their rate of growth.
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FINANCIAL STRUCTURE IN CHILE:
MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND MICROECONOMIC EFFECTS
1. INTRODUCTION
The outstanding macroeconomic performance of Chile in the late 1980s and 1990s
has been portrayed as an example of successful market-oriented policies and, as such, has
been the subject of numerous studies (see Bosworth, Dornbusch, and Labán 1994; and
Perry and Leipziger 1999).  Recently, one of the areas receiving the largest attention is
financial development (see Eyzaguirre and Lefort 1999).  This emphasis is well justified
given the remarkable growth in banking intermediation and stock market capitalization
since the mid-1980s, which placed Chile as the financial leader in Latin America a decade
later.  By 1995, the ratio of credit allocated by deposit money banks to GDP in Chile was
49%, almost fifty percent larger than Brazil’s, the second country in the region in this
respect.  By the same year, stock market capitalization as a ratio to GDP reached 105% in
Chile, at least three times bigger than in any other country in Latin America (see Loayza
and Palacios 1997).
The objective of this paper is to describe the developments in Chilean financial
markets at the macroeconomic level and then examine their effects at the level of firms.  At
the macroeconomic level, we pay special attention to the evolution of financial structure,
that is, the relative development of the banking sector vis-a-vis the stock, bond, and other
capital markets.  Analogously, at the level of firms we study not only their general access to
financial markets but also how their financing (balance-sheet) decisions have evolved in the
last decade.
The paper is organized as follows.  The second section reviews the macroeconomic
development of financial markets in Chile in the last three decades.  First, we describe the
government policies towards financial markets.  These have followed a rather pendulous
process.  They have transited from heavily interventionist (pre-1973) to radically market
oriented (1974-81) and, after a serious banking crisis, to prudentially regulated (1985-
1990s).  More recently, the 1990s can be considered the second wave of deregulation, as
the access to and from international financial markets was gradually eased during this
period.  In the second part of this section, we characterize the developments in the banking3
sector as well as in various types of capital markets (bond, stock, pension and insurance
markets.)  We conduct this assessment following the criteria proposed by Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine (1999), that is evaluating, in turn, the size, activity, and efficiency of the most
important financial markets.
In the third section of the paper, we analyze the changes in both the access to
financial markets and the financing (balance-sheet) decisions that have occurred in the last
decade in a sample of Chilean firms.  The sample consists of 79 firms that are quoted in the
stock market and for which annual balance sheet data for the period 1985-1995 are
available and complete.  The purpose of this section is to estimate and test econometrically
three issues.  The first concerns the access to financial markets.  In particular, we would
like to test whether the reliance on internal funds for investment has decreased in the 1990s
relative to the 1980s and, thus, whether investment has been more responsive to changes in
the q-value of the firm.  The second issue relates to the balance-sheet situation of the firms.
Specifically, we would like to examine whether the financial liberalization of the 1990s and
the development of the banking, stock and bond markets at the aggregate level have
affected the importance of debt relative to equity and long-term debt relative to total debt in
the balance sheet of firms.  The third microeconomic issue concerns the growth rate of the
firm, measured by the proportional increase in the firm’s operational revenue.   We would
like to study the extent to which firm-specific and aggregate financial market developments
have impacted on the growth of our sample of firms.
A brief literature review and this paper's value added.  As mentioned above, quite a
few papers have examined the recent experience in financial markets at the macro level in
Chile.  The majority of them study the policy changes concerning banking regulations and
supervision and their effect on the banks' assets and portfolio (see Arellano 1983, Brock
1992, Valdés 1992, Budnevich 1997, Larraín 1995, and Ramírez and Rosende 1992.)
Others address the financial and macroeconomic effects of capital account controls and
liberalization (see Johnston, Darbar, and Echeverría 1997; Soto 1997; Valdés-Prieto and
Soto 1997; and De Gregorio, Edwards, and Valdés 1999.)  Only recently, some studies
have taken a broad approach on capital markets, attempting to provide a comprehensive
perspective on the joint development of the banking sector, the stock and bond markets, and
insurance markets in Chile (Reinstein and Rosende 1999, Eyzaguirre and Lefort 1999, and4
Lefort and Walker 1999).  Mostly based on time-series correlations, these papers agree in
linking the recent improvements in financial depth and activity in Chile to its high rates of
GDP growth in the late 1980s and 1990s.  They provide, however, dissimilar views on the
causes of financial development and the relative importance of the various components of
the financial system.  The first part of this paper, on the assessment of the financial system
at the aggregate level, is similar to the latter studies.  The perspective of this paper is,
however, different in that the comparisons between banking and capital markets are
emphasized.  This is done in an attempt to answer the question of whether the financial
system in Chile has become bank-based or market-based.  Moreover, the evaluation of
financial markets, following the criteria of size, activity, and efficiency, is done to enlighten
the second part of the paper.  In this part, we study the effect of financial development at
the aggregate level on the firms' financial structure and access to credit and equity markets.
For the second part of the paper, on microeconomic evidence, we follow two
research traditions.  The first studies how the investment behavior of the firm is determined
by financial constraints apart from the profit-maximizing considerations imbedded in the
firm's q-value (see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein
1991; Stein 1997; and Hu and Schiantarelli 1998.) To the extent that firms face constraints
on or high costs of external financing, their investment depends not only on its profitability
but is limited by both the availability of internal resources and the balance-sheet
composition of the firm.  Medina and Valdés (1998) provide an interesting application of
this research line to the Chilean experience.  In a sample of stock-market-traded firms in
Chile, they find that firms' financial constraints do affect their investment behavior,
particularly in the firms not regarded as “investment grade.”  In this paper, we assess the
effect of financial development by analyzing whether firms are less dependent on their
internal resources and balance-sheet composition and more responsive to their Tobin's q-
value as result of financial development (for a similar application to Indonesia, see Harris,
Schiantarelli, and Siregar 1994.)
The second research tradition we follow studies the firm-specific and aggregate
factors that determine the financial structure of the firm (see Aivazian, Booth, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Maksimovic 1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 1995; and Schmukler and
Vesperoni 1999.)  In this tradition, Hernández and Walker (1993) examine whether the5
financial crisis of 1983-84 in Chile and the ensuing enactment of banking prudential
regulations affected the debt and equity composition of domestic non-financial firms.  They
find that after the crisis the debt-equity ratio declined, particularly in firms in the tradable
sector.  This resulted from the liquidation of assets and corresponding debt reduction
induced by the new prudential banking regulations.  Focusing on the period 1985-95, in this
paper we examine whether changes in various sectors of the Chilean financial system have
had an impact on the firms' preference for and availability of equity, long-term debt, and
short-term debt as alternative financing choices.  Controlling for firm characteristics such
as size and tangibility of assets and reported profitability, we estimate the balance-sheet
effect of the size and activity of banking, stock, and bond markets.
Finally, we also provide estimation results regarding the macro and micro
determinants of firm growth.  With this we intend to replicate at the micro level the
empirical work that links financial development to GDP growth (see Levine 1997; and
Levine, Loayza, and Beck 1999).  However, given that our sample of firms is not
representative of all economic activities in Chile, we are careful both in interpreting the
results regarding the growth impact of macro variables and in accounting for firm-specific
factors (see Nickell, Wadhwani, and Wall 1992; and Bernstein and Nadiri 1993.)    Adding
this empirical exercise to those mentioned above, we intend to give a rather broad picture of
how macro financial development and structure in the 1990s has affected the firms' access
to financial markets, their balance-sheet structure, and their growth performance.
2. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS AT THE MACRO LEVEL (1960-97)
To examine the macroeconomic developments in the Chilean financial system in the
last three decades, this section first presents a brief description of related economic policies
and then describes the sector’s performance over the period.
A. Financial Sector Policies
This section reviews the main policies related to the Chilean financial system in the
last 30 years.   These policies follow a combination of historic elements (such as the
country’s legal tradition) and an extension of the general development model followed by6
the country at each point in time. The financial policy periods identified below correspond
to those of general economic policies.
a. Financial Repression, Pre-1973
Reflecting the inward-looking development model implemented in those years in
Chile and most other Latin American countries, the financial sector was extremely
regulated. This meant the prevalence of controlled interest rates, quantitative restrictions on
credit, mandated allocation of credit to priority sectors, and large state ownership of banks
and other financial institutions.
1
b. Financial Liberalization, 1974-81
  The radical shift in the country’s development model started in 1974 was reflected
in the removal of most regulations affecting the banking sector.  Consistent with the logic
of market liberalization, the determination of interest rates and domestic credit was left to
market forces. Thus, interest rates were completely freed by January 1976, entry barriers in
the banking industry were eliminated in 1975, and liquidity requirement rates were
diminished for the majority of deposit types between 1974 and 1980.  Quantitative controls
on credit were eliminated and banks were privatized in April 1976, while a gradual opening
of the capital account took place between 1975 and 1980.
Similarly, several reforms allowed the development of other capital markets such as
insurance, bond, and stock markets.  In 1976, a stock register was created, and the public
disclosure of information was made mandatory. In 1981, a series of laws destined to protect
minority shareholders and prevent the misuse of privileged information were enacted.  Also
in 1981, the issuance of long-term bonds was facilitated.  In 1980, insurance market rates
were liberalized while prudential regulations on insurance companies’ portfolios were
implemented. The same year, a fully funded pension system began to operate, and private
institutions started to manage the pension funds by investing them in various financial
instruments.
In contrast to the prudential regulation established for capital markets, the banking
sector lacked a well-developed regulatory and supervisory system.  In addition, there
existed an implicit state guarantee on deposits, which became evident in the rescue of
                                               
1 It is interesting to notice that this phenomenon shows a growing trend throughout this period, since in the
initial situation, prior to the 1930s crisis, the Chilean financial sector was relatively free and developed
(Jeftanovic 1979).7
Banco de Osorno y la Unión and other financial institutions in 1976.  The implicit
government guarantees together with the lack of appropriate banking regulation and the
preferential tax treatment of debt obligations created moral hazard problems that
deteriorated the banks’ asset portfolio and prepared the grounds for a banking crisis.
c. Banking Crisis, 1982-84
In 1982, a negative terms of trade shock, a sharp increase in international interest
rates, and a consequent large devaluation of the Chilean currency worsened the quality of
most banks’ portfolio and made some of them insolvent. In the wake of this banking crisis,
the liberalization process was partially reversed given that, first, the state became the
manager and main creditor of rescued banks, and second, the state reinstated financial
controls such as restrictions on external capital movements and “suggested” interest rates
by the Central Bank.
d. Prudential Regulation, 1985-90
The controls on interest rates were eliminated in 1985 and a new banking law was
enacted.  This established a modern prudential regulation, an enforced supervisory capacity
by the state, and an explicit deposit insurance.  Under the new law, the state helped the
banks by allowing them to recapitalize and issue long-term debt (which the Central Bank
bought) to replace their existing non-performing assets.  Thus, the state assumed an
important share of the costs of the 1982 banking crisis.
The regulatory framework for other capital markets was also improved during this
period. A new bankruptcy law that clarified the extent of private sector responsibility in
failing enterprises was implemented. Also, the purchase of equity in domestic firms by the
private pension fund managers was allowed and regulated.  Finally, the tax reform of 1984
eliminated the preferential treatment of debt liabilities by the firms (with respect to equity)
and provided incentives for financial saving by all investors.
The privatization of large state enterprises (the telephone and power companies and
some mining corporations), the re-capitalization of rescued banks, and a significant external
debt-to-equity conversion by private firms strongly promoted the development of the stock
market and the pension fund managers (the largest institutional investors in Chile) and
helped extend the ownership of capital throughout society.
e. External Financial Deregulation, 1991-998
In this period, the reforms started in the late 1980s were strengthened and,
moreover, a number of constraints related to external capital account transactions were
lifted.  Specifically, first, firms with good credit rating were allowed to issue bonds and
shares in external markets; second, institutional investors, such as banks, pension fund
managers, and insurance companies, were allowed to hold external assets; third, the
permanence requirements for external investment and profits were gradually eased; and
fourth, international trade payments transactions were liberalized. Until recently, however,
the Central Bank maintained capital controls in the form of an unremunerated reserve
requirement on external funds, which was advocated on the grounds that it deterred volatile
short-run capital.  In September 1998 this requirement was virtually eliminated.
In 1997, a new capital market law was passed by congress that regulated the
participation of banks in non-traditional areas, such as factoring, non-pension insurance,
and investment banking.
Finally, it is in this period when some regulations regarding the operations of
private pension funds started to show some flaws.  Specifically, the capital penalties
imposed by law for underperformance led all private funds to mimic each other’s portfolio
excessively.  Furthermore, the restrictions on the type of investments that private pension
funds were allowed to hold produced asset portfolios not sufficiently diversified.
Indices of financial sector policies
The policy changes studied above can be summarized in financial liberalization
indices.  This has been done by Bandiera, Caprio, Honohan, and Schiantarelli (1998) and
Morley, Machado, and Pettinato (1998). These indices are presented in Figure 2.1.  Both
indices reflect well the 5 periods of Chilean financial policy, with the initial liberalization
in the mid-1970s, the partial reversion after the crisis in the early 1980s, and the
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Source: Author’s elaboration using Bandiera et al. (1998) and Morley et al. (1998).
B. Financial Sector Performance
This section will describe the main results of the Chilean financial system,
emphasizing the measures proposed by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) to determine the
size, activity, and efficiency of banking and capital markets.  At the end of this section, we
compare the relative development in the main financial markets.  Thus, we attempt to
assess whether the Chilean economy can be best characterized as bank-based or stock-
market-based.
a. Financial System: Global Results
Figure 2.2 presents the evolution of the size of the financial sector in Chile from
1960 to the present. It also presents the contribution of the main financial markets, namely,
banks, the stock market, and the bond market, all relative to GDP.10
Figure 2.2
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Source: Beck et al. (1999), Jeftanovic (1979), Central Bank of Chile, and CB Capitales.
From the mid-1970s onwards the financial system starts to grow, particularly the
banks but also the stock market. The bond market expanded particularly in the 1980s, while
the stock market experienced a striking increase in the 1990s.  Then, it would appear that
the financial policy changes and the macroeconomic outcomes during the period had a
significant impact not only on the overall growth of the financial sector but also on its
structure and composition. However, it is interesting to observe that the growth of financial
markets has not been smooth but has also experienced temporary booms.  For instance, the
banking credit boom that took place before the 1982 crisis was partially reversed, and so
was the stock market expansion in the mid-1990s, though to a lesser extent.
b. Banking Sector
Size.  Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of banks’ financial assets as a fraction of GDP.
It exhibits a growing trend from 1977, with a downward correction in the mid-1980s.  By
1997, the financial assets of the banking sector represented 55.1% of GDP, a proportion
higher than the world average (52.6%) and the largest in Latin America (whose average is
27.9%.)
Activity.  To examine the activity of the banking sector, we consider the behavior of
private credit extended by commercial banks relative to GDP. As Figure 2.3 shows, the
evolution of banking sector activity is very similar to that of its size, with a sustained
growth from 1974 to 1982, a reversal from 1982 to 1988, and a new increase from 1991. It11
is important to note that the “reversal” in the 1980s reflected, to a large degree, the
correction of an unsustainable “credit boom”, as described by Gourinchas, Landerretche,
and Valdés 1998.  This alerts us to the fact that some changes, particularly short-lived ones,
in these outcome indicators not always reflect financial development or weakening.
In the 1990s, banking activity has experienced a moderate and steady growth,
following the new regulatory framework of the late 1980s and accompanying the fast
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Figure 2.3 also serves to compare banking sector activity in Chile with that of the
world. The “development line” proposed by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999)
corresponds to the world average of banking activity.  According to their criterion, a
country’s banking sector can be regarded as “developed” if its activity is above the
“development line.”  In the case of Chile, the banking sector can be regarded as highly
underdeveloped until the early 1980s; it then attains a developed status, which is
maintained for the rest of the period.
Efficiency.  To assess the efficiency of the banking sector, we analyze the evolution
of overhead costs and the sector´s gross margins.  We have data available for 1976-8212
(from De la Cuadra and Valdés-Prieto 1992) and for 1990-97 (from Beck et al. 1999.)  Both
overhead costs and gross margins of the banking sector fell notably in the 1970s, that is, at
the start of the liberalization process.  In the 1990s, both indicators are relatively stable.
This should not be taken to imply that the sector’s efficiency has stagnated during the
period.  According to Fuentes and Basch (1998), this stability is related to the higher degree
of competition faced by banks in providing financing sources, which has led them to
concentrate in alternative markets, such as personal banking or small to medium firms,
which are associated with higher costs.
To complement the previous analysis (and to fill the 1980s gap,) we also study the
spreads on short-run (less than a year) banking lending and borrowing operations.  As
Figure 2.4 shows, the behavior of banking spreads tell a similar story for the 1970s and
1990s to that of overhead costs and gross margins.  The information provided by banking
spreads in the early and mid-1980s should be taken with care.  In particular the sharp fall in
banking spreads in 1984 does not reveal a dramatic (and short-lived) improvement in
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Source: Beck et al. (1999), De la Cuadra and Valdés-Prieto (1992),
and Central Bank of Chile13
c. Stock Market
Size.  As customary, we assess the size of the stock market by its capitalization
relative to GDP.  Figure 2.2 shows that the size of the stock market grew gradually in the
1970s and 1980s and experienced a rapid expansion in the last decade, reaching 105% of
GDP in 1995.  Only in the 1990s the size of the stock market in Chile became larger than
the world average (which was 18.5% in the1970s, 28.4% in the 1980s, and 38.2% in the
1990s.)
Activity.  To measure the activity of the stock market, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine
(1999) propose to use the stock traded value to GDP.  The evolution of this variable in
Chile is presented in Figure 2.5.  It shows a gradual increase in the 1970s and a rapid rise
since 1985, which led the stock market activity to reach a peak of 17% of GDP in 1995.
Despite this growth, using the criterion described in the section on the banking sector, the
stock market in Chile would still be classified as underdeveloped.  (The “development line”
in Figure 2.5, representing the world average, gives the threshold above which a country’s
stock market is classified as developed.)
However, as explained in the section on financial policies, starting in the 1990s it is
possible for firms with good credit rating to issue shares abroad. This means that for this
group of firms, the relevant stock market is not only Chile’s but also that of developed
countries, particularly the U.S. For this reason, Figure 2.5 also presents the total traded
value, which is the sum of traded value in the Chilean stock market and abroad.
Interestingly, the traded value of Chilean shares doubles when their activity in the U.S.
stock markets is included (from 8.5% to 17.1% of GDP in the 1990s).  However, given the
large transaction costs involved in issuing share abroad, medium- and small-size firms are
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Source: Beck et al. (1999) and Valenzuela (1984).
Efficiency.  Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) argue that both the stock market
traded value to GDP and the turnover ratio provide information as to how efficient the
stock market is.  These, however, are incomplete proxies and we would like to complement
them with measures that directly address the transaction costs to participate in the stock
market.
1
Considering the turnover ratio as measure of efficiency, Figure 2.6 shows the
significant rise in the stock market efficiency during the 1990s, especially after 1992 when
Chilean shares began to be traded offshore.  Note that during the first liberalization stage
(1974-81), the turnover ratio did not rise with respect to its historical average, even though
there was a significant increase in its size during that period.  Figure 2.6 presents the
turnover ratio that includes the Chilean shares traded abroad. As in the case of the traded
value to GDP, total turnover is also twice as big as that in the Santiago stock exchange.
                                               
1 A simple example may clarify why traded value or turnover are incomplete proxies for stock market
efficiency.  Suppose that domestic firms start to issue shares abroad.  This will likely lead to a decrease in the
activity and liquidity of the domestic stock market.  If however, domestic stockbrokers become more cost-
effective to regain their market participation, then the stock market becomes more efficient even though the
ratios of activity and liquidity indicate otherwise.15
Still, total turnover remains below the world average for the 1990s and, thus, should be
considered as underdeveloped.
Figure 2.6









1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Turnover in Chile Total Turnover
Source: Beck et al. (1999) and Valenzuela (1984).
Given the incomplete information on efficiency provided by the turnover ratio, we
present a complementary measure based on the costs to participate in the stock market.
This is proxied by the ratio of stockbrokers’ gross profit over assets. Considering that
stockbrokers concentrate most of daily transactions, this measure indicates the costs of
trading in the stock market.  According to this measure Figure 2.7 also indicates improving
market efficiency over the last decade.16
Figure 2.7
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d. Other capital markets
Among the other functioning financial sectors in Chile, we can cite, (i) the pension
fund management companies (PFMC), (ii) insurance companies, (iii) mutual funds, (iv)
financial societies, and (v) the public and private bond market.  In this section we identify
the main characteristics of the evolution of these sectors, with emphasis on its size and
activity.
Pension Funds.  As mentioned in the section on financial sector policies, in 1981 the
pension system was transformed into a system of fully-funded individual capitalization
accounts, managed by the PFMCs.  The fund administrators invest the pension savings in a
series of instruments, ranging from domestic public debt to foreign bonds.  These agents
have mobilized a gradually increasing amount of financial resources, with a strong positive
effect on the development of other financial sectors and activities.
Figure 2.8 shows the evolution of the PFMCs’ pension assets together with their
composition. The pension funds’ assets have grown since their inception, reaching levels
above 40% of GDP in the 1993-98 period.  Regarding the funds’ composition by
instrument, public bonds represent in average as much as 9% of GDP, which corresponds to
about 40% of total public debt.  Other important investment instruments used by the
pension funds are mortgage bonds (4% of GDP or 60% of total mortgage bonds); corporate
bonds (1.4% of GDP or 50% of total corporate bonds in Chile); and stock shares (6% of
GDP in average or 10% of the total stock of shares).17
Figure 2.8
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Source: Schmidt-Hebbel (1999).
It is interesting to note that the life insurance market benefited significantly from the
development of the private pension funds. This occurred because of the requirement for the
pension fund managers to purchase life insurance on behalf of all their contributors.
Payments to insurance companies from the PFMCs averaged about 0.24% of GDP in1988-
97, which represented revenues for the insurance companies of 10% of their assets.
Regarding the pension funds’ efficiency, their average return has been very high, that
is, 11% in average since 1981.  However, the operational costs of the pension management
companies have also been high in comparison with international standards, which raises
doubts as to their efficiency.
Bond market. The most active bond markets in Chile correspond to public bonds
(mostly from the Central Bank), mortgage bonds, and corporate bonds.  Figure 2.9 shows
the evolution of each instrument since 1980.  It can be seen that public bonds have a large
jump in the early 1990s, partly due to the policy of sterilizing the large capitals flows from
abroad. The mortgage bonds show an important development since 1980, from an average
of 1.4% of GDP in the previous two decades to about 6.7% of GDP in 1981-97 (reaching
11% of GDP in 1997.)  Finally, corporate bonds were first issued in 1975, grew slowly
until the late 1980s, and increased more markedly in the 1990s.  Thus, from a level of 0.2%18
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Source: SVS (various issues), Eyzaguirre and Lefort (1999), and CB Capitales.
Insurance companies, mutual funds, and financial societies. The assets of insurance
companies have grown from 0.7% of GDP in the late 1970s (Jeftanovic, 1979) to 11% in
1997.  This asset growth was caused by an increase in both insurance penetration and
density.  Mutual funds have developed particularly since the early 1990s, reaching a level
of 6% of GDP in 1997.  Finally, financial societies flourished in the initial period of
liberalization (until 1981) but suffered serious problems during the banking crisis.  They
have grown moderately during the 1990s but have yet to reach asset levels above 2% of
GDP.
2
C. Financial Structure: Bank-Based or Market-Based?
We now study whether the Chilean economy is based on banks or markets. To
analyze this point, we use the approach and indicators developed by Demirguc-Kunt and
                                               
2 Financial societies are saving and loan institutions that, in contrast to banks, do not create money.19
Levine (1999.)  That is, we study the evolution of size, activity and efficiency of the
banking sector, relative to those of the stock and other capital markets.
3
Relative Size. With regards to the relative size of the different sectors of the
financial system, Figure 2.10 shows two measures.  The first compares banks and the stock
market and the second, banks and other financial institutions, namely, financial societies,
PFMCs, mutual funds, and insurance companies.  The liberalization process has been
generally related to a shift in the financial structure of the economy, in a way such that the
stock and other capital markets have gained importance relative to the banking sector.  This
trend started in the 1970s and has accelerated in the late 1980s and 1990s.
Figure 2.10
Financial Structure: Size 
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Relative Activity.  As Figure 2.11 shows, the activity of the stock and other capital
markets relative to that of the banking sector has an increasing trend since the early 1970s,
which mimics the trend in their relative size.   These trends may be the result of an
adjustment from an initial situation in which the non-banking sector was too small for the
                                               
3 We should note that the financial indicators under consideration suffer from high volatility in the short term.
This is exacerbated when we combine two or more of them.  Given that we are interested in long-run trends,
we smoothed the financial structure ratios by fitting a second order polynomial.20
level of development of the Chilean economy.  In this sense, the change in the financial
structure in Chile is analogous to a stock-adjustment process –the economy “accumulates”
the financial institutions of relative scarcity.  Therefore, it is likely that the increasing trend
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Relative Efficiency.  Finally, we examine two alternative indicators to study the
efficiency of the stock market relative to the banking sector.  The first indicator is the one
proposed by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) which compares the stock market’s
turnover with the spreads on banking borrowing and lending operations.  The second
indicator is the ratio of banking spreads to stockbrokers’ return on assets.  A rise in both
indicators represents an increase in the stock market’s efficiency relative to the banks’.  The
evolution of these indicators is presented in Figure 2.12.  The results for both indicators are
very similar and show that the stock market has been gaining in efficiency relative to the
banking sector since the mid-1980s.  This result confirms the increasing relative importance
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3. MICROECONOMIC EVIDENCE
In this section, we study the access to financial markets, the balance-sheet
composition, and the growth performance in a sample of Chilean firms.  The emphasis of
the empirical exercises presented here is on how financial developments at the
macroeconomic level have affected the performance and financial structure of firms.
Sample and data.  Our sample consists of 79 firms that are quoted at the stock
market and for which annual balance-sheet data for the period 1985-95 are available and
complete.  We focus on the period from 1985-95 because, first, it corresponds to before and
after the second wave of financial liberalization in Chile; second, it is the period of
significant stock market development; and, third, it is the period for which reliable data are
accessible.  Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the four dependent variables
examined below.  This is done for the whole period as well as for the sub-periods 1986-90
and 1991-95.  As argued in the section on macro developments, the latter period is
characterized by a further liberalization of domestic financial markets and an opening to
international capital.22
Balance-sheet data are obtained from the Ficha Estadística Codificada Uniforme
(FECU), which is a mandatory report submitted by corporations to the corresponding
government supervisory board.  The FECU contains the firm’s balance sheet data in a
comparable base for the 1985-95 period.  Market value data are obtained from the Reseña
de la Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago (RCBS), which is the annual report of the Santiago
Stock Exchange.  Finally, macro-financial data are obtained from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine (1999) and extended using the Chilean national sources cited in the previous
section.  For further details on data sources and definitions, see Annex 1.
Econometric Methodology.  All relationships studied and estimated in this paper are
characterized by the joint endogeneity of most variables involved.  That is, most
explanatory variables in our models either are simultaneously determined with the
dependent variable or have a two-way causality relationship with it.  Thus, for example, in
our investment regressions, it is likely that investment and cash flow be simultaneously
determined or that investment may feedback into the firm’s q-value.  The joint endogeneity
of the explanatory variables calls for an instrumental variable procedure to obtain consistent
estimates of the coefficients of interest.  Taking advantage of the panel structure of our data
set, we apply a GMM estimator based on the use of lagged observations of the explanatory
variables as instruments (see Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen 1990; and Arellano and
Bover 1995.)  These are appropriate instruments under the following conditions.  First, the
error term must be serially uncorrelated or, at least, follow a moving average process of
finite order.  Second, future innovations of the dependent variable must not affect current
values of the explanatory variables, although they can be affected by current and past
realizations of the dependent variable (this being the sense in which they are jointly
endogenous.)
The validity of these assumptions can be examined statistically.  For this purpose
we use two specification tests.  The first is a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions,
which examines the overall validity of the moment conditions comparing them with their
sample analogs.  The second is a test of serial correlation of the regression residuals.  Lack
of serial correlation indicates that all lagged values of the explanatory variables can be used
as instruments.  Serial correlation of a given order means that the residual follows a moving23
average process of the same order, which in turn indicates that only observations lagged
more than this order are appropriate instruments.
The second issue we must address in the process of estimation is the potential
presence of unobserved firm-specific effects.  Ignoring them may produce inconsistent
estimates given that firm-specific effects are likely to be correlated with the explanatory
variables.  An indication that unobserved firm-specific effects are present in a regression
model is a persistent serial correlation of the residuals.  When we find evidence of this type
of misspecification in the regression in levels, we control for unobserved firm-specific
effects following the procedure developed by Arellano and Bond (1992) and Arellano and
Bover (1995).  This procedure consists of combining in a system the regression expressed
in levels with the regression expressed in first differences, each of them properly
instrumented.  The instruments for the regression in differences (which no longer contain
the firm-specific effect) are the lagged levels of the explanatory variables.  For the
regression in levels, the instruments are the lagged differences of the explanatory variables.
These are appropriate instruments under the assumption that the correlation between the
explanatory variables and the firm-specific effect is constant over time. This procedure is
called the GMM system estimator (for a concise presentation of this methodology, see
Levine, Loayza, and Beck 1999.)
The specification tests for the system estimator are similar to those introduced
above.  The first is a Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, and the second is a test of
lack of residual serial correlation.  Since in this case the residuals examined are those of the
regression in differences, first-order serial correlation is expected by construction and, thus,
only second- and higher-order serial correlation is a sign of misspecification.
A. Firm Investment and Financing Constraints
The first issue we study concerns the firms’ access to financial markets for
investment purposes. In particular, we would like to test whether, as result of the financial
development experienced in the 1990s, firms are less dependent on their internal resources
and balance-sheet composition and more responsive to their Tobin's q-value.
The basic regression model we estimate is the following:
t i t i t i t i t i K D Cash q Inv , , 3 1 , 2 , 1 0 , / e b b b b + + + + = - (1)24
where, Invt is the flow of annual investment as a ratio to the capital stock at the beginning
of the year, qt is the market value of the firm over its replacement value measured at the
beginning of the year, Casht-1 is the ratio of cash flow of the previous year to the capital
stock at the beginning of the year, D/Kt is the ratio of total debt to the capital stock
measured at the beginning of the year, et is the regression residual, and the subscript i is an
index for firms.  All variables are treated as “weakly” endogenous, in the sense that they
can be correlated with current and past realizations of the residual but are required to be
uncorrelated with its future realizations.  We ignore unobserved firm-specific effects
because, as we discuss below, there is no persistent residual serial correlation in the levels
regression.
According to the q theory of investment, in the absence of financial restrictions and
corporate agency problems, firm investment depends exclusively on the (marginal) value of
the firm relative to its replacement value.  However, to the extent that the firm faces
constraints on external financing, its investment will be determined by its internal
resources, namely, retained cash earnings.  Furthermore, in the face of imperfect financial
markets, the degree of leverage of the firm (here represented by its debt-to-capital ratio)
may deter the availability of external financing even after controlling for Tobin’s q.
Therefore, we consider that a firm faces a better functioning financial system when, first, its
investment is more responsive to changes in q; second, investment is less determined by the
firm’s cash flow; and, third, investment is less negatively affected by the firm’s liability
composition, represented by the debt-to-capital ratio.
The first empirical exercise is a comparison between all firms in the sample and two
subgroups of firms that are expected to have better access to financial markets.  These are,
first, the group of firms in whose shares the private pension fund management companies
are allowed to invest (PFMC investment grade, for short); and, second, the group of firms
that are members of corporate conglomerates (see Medina and Valdés 1998.)  We compare
the coefficients obtained for different sample groups through multiplicative dummies
applied to the three variables of interest.  The estimation results are presented in Table 3.2.
Columns 1 and 2 make the comparison between all firms and PFMC-grade firms; and
columns 3 and 4 make the comparison with firms belonging to conglomerate members.  For
each comparison, we present two estimators, a simple pooled OLS estimator and a GMM25
estimator, both applied to the regression in levels.  We focus on the latter estimator because
it controls for the joint endogeneity of the explanatory variables and because it is supported
by the Sargan and serial correlation specification test.
4
The results presented in Table 3.2 reveal that in the sample of all firms, investment
does not significantly depend on the firm's q-value but is driven positively by the firm's
cash flow and negatively by its level of indebtedness.  According to the interpretation of
investment theory provided above, we can conclude that firms in the whole sample face
important constraints on external finance.  This conclusion, however, does not apply
equally to all firms.  In fact, the comparison between all firms and PFMC-grade firms
indicates that investment in the latter type is significantly more responsive to changes in q
and less dependent on cash flow.  However, there appears to be no significant difference
regarding the investment response to the debt-to-capital ratio.  The results on q and cash
flow are to be expected given that PFMC-grade firms are usually larger, better established,
and enjoying the signaling derived from their investment-grade accreditation; thus, they are
likely to face a more receptive financial environment than the average firm. In contrast, the
comparison regarding members of conglomerates indicates that they are different with
respect to the whole sample only in the sense that their investment does not depend on their
debt-to-capital ratio.  Given that for this type of firms the relevant amount of "internal
resources" for investment is that of the whole conglomerate, we would also have expected
that their investment be less dependent on each firm's cash flow.  One possible explanation
for this result is that the cash flows of conglomerate members are highly correlated with
each other.
The second empirical exercise on the investment regression model consists of
comparing the response coefficients in the 1990s with those of the 1980s.  This exercise is
central to our paper because the 1990s is a period of significantly higher financial
development than any time before.  The relaxation of financial constraints for firms in the
1990s would be a strong indication of beneficial microeconomic effects from
macroeconomic financial developments.   Table 3.3 presents the results of comparing the
                                               
4 Given that there is no evidence of persistent residual serial correlation, we do not use the GMM system
estimator but stay with the GMM estimator in levels.  The correlation tests give evidence that the residual
follows a moving average process of order 1; our choice of the lagged order of the instruments is consistent
with this dynamic structure of the error term.26
1990s with the 1980s through multiplicative dummies on the explanatory variables.  We do
this exercise for the samples of all, PFMC-grade, and conglomerate-member firms,
respectively.  In the three cases, the GMM estimator in levels is supported by the
specification tests, and, thus, we base our conclusions on its results.
The results on the three samples are similar in that they indicate that in the 1990s
firm investment has been less financially constrained than in the 1980s.  This conclusion is
most strongly based on the PFMC-grade sample results.  For this sample of firms,
investment is less financially constrained in the three dimensions under consideration.  That
is, firm investment is more responsive to changes in Tobin's q, is no longer tied to internal
cash flow, and is not affected by the debt-to-capital ratio.  The first two results also hold
true in the samples of all firms and conglomerate-member firms; however, the evidence that
the debt-to-capital ratio no longer affects firm investment is weaker in these two samples of
firms.
The last empirical exercise for the investment model consists of adding some
macro-financial indicators to the regression that already considers the 1990s effect.  The
results are presented in Table 3.4.  Column 1 considers the effect of financial size variables,
namely, the ratio of bank assets to GDP and stock market capitalization relative to GDP.
Column 2 considers measures of financial activity, that is, the ratio of private credit to GDP
and the stock market traded value relative to GDP.  Finally, column 3 considers the
Bandiera et al. index of financial liberalization.  The simple conclusion from this exercise is
that these macro financial variables do not have an independent effect on investment once
the q-value of the firm and the 1990s effect are accounted for.  In other words, the effect on
firm investment from macro financial development appears to work through
microeconomic channels, that is, by making investment more responsive to the firm's q-
value and less constrained on the use of external finance.
B. Firm Financial Structure
The second issue we study concerns the balance-sheet, financial situation of the
firms.  Specifically, we would like to examine whether the financial liberalization of the
1990s and the development of the banking, stock and bond markets over the last decade27
have affected the importance of debt relative to equity and long-term debt relative to total
debt in the balance sheet of firms.
The basic regression model for each dependent variable is the following:
t i i t t i t i t i t i t i MFin IntEq TA P TA FA K E D , 5 , 4 , 3 , 2 , 1 0 , / / ) ln( / e h b b b b b b + + + + + + + = (2)
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The dependent variables, D/E and LD/TD, are the debt-to-equity ratio and the ratio of long-
term to total debt, respectively.  K represents the capital stock, which proxies for the firm’s
size.  FA/TA represents the ratio of fixed to total assets, which is a measure of the
tangibility of total assets.  P/TA is the ratio of operational profits to total assets and proxies
for the firm’s current profitability.  IntEq is a dummy variable for whether the firm has
been able to place its stock shares in international equity markets.  MFin is a vector of
variables representing macro financial outcome or policy variables.  All stock variables are
measured at the end of the corresponding year.  The regression residuals are represented by
e and n, respectively.  All explanatory variables are treated as weakly endogenous, except
the macro financial variables, which are exogenous.  Finally, h and m are unobserved firm-
specific effects.  We consider firm-specific effects in the financial structure regression
equations because the regression in levels exhibits highly persistent serial correlation,
which leads us to reject the GMM levels estimator in favor of its GMM system counterpart.
The Sargan and serial correlation tests support the model estimated with the GMM system
procedure.
The firm-related explanatory variables are chosen in accordance with standard
corporate finance theory (for a recent similar application, see Schmukler and Vesperoni
1999.)   In contrast to the investment regression model, for financial structure there is no
clear way in which macro financial development affects the coefficients on the firm-
specific variables.  Therefore, our previous strategy based on analyzing slope changes is not
applicable to the financial structure regressions.  Instead, we directly include our measures
of macro financial development in the regression model and analyze their estimated
coefficients.  Note that since these variables do not change across firms, they are analogous
to time-specific effects.
Table 3.5 reports the results on the debt-to-equity ratio, and Table 3.6, on the ratio
of long-term to total debt.  Columns 1 and 2 of each table report the results obtained with28
pooled OLS and GMM-level estimators, respectively.  Since the specification tests reject
them, we focus on the results obtained with the GMM-system estimator, which are
presented in the next three columns.  In column 3, the macro financial variables are given
by measures of the size of the banking sector and the stock market.  In column 4, the macro
financial variables studied are also outcome measures but of activity, rather than size.  They
are the ratio of private credit by banks to GDP (for the banking sector) and the ratio of
stock share traded value to GDP (for the stock market).  Finally, column 5 considers the
Bandiera et al. index of financial liberalization as the macro financial development variable
of interest.
Regarding the debt-to-equity ratio (Table 3.5), a rise in the firm’s size and, less
robustly, an increase in its assets’ tangibility and profitability appear to shift the financial
structure of the firm towards higher equity and lower debt.  Somewhat paradoxically, the
firm’s access to international equity markets appears to increase the debt-to-equity ratio of
the firm.
5  It is likely that the ability to issue ADRs has a positive signaling effect on the
firm’s creditworthiness.  This effect might decrease the costs of indebtedness sufficiently to
overcome the direct equity-promoting effect of issuing ADRs.
The effects of the measures of macro financial size and activity on the debt-to-
equity ratio are similar and in agreement with our priors.  Larger size and activity of the
banking sector lead firms to prefer debt over equity in their balance sheets.  Conversely,
larger size and activity of the stock market induce firms to expand equity relative to debt.
The financial liberalization index has a negative impact on the debt-to-equity ratio,
probably reflecting that financial liberalization in the last decade has concentrated on
international capital and domestic equity markets.
Regarding the ratio of long-term to total debt (Table 3.6), once we account for
unobserved firm-specific effects, the size of the firm is not significantly associated with the
maturity structure of its debt.  On the other hand, the tangibility of assets is positively and
significantly linked with a longer maturity of the firm’s debt, while asset profitability
appears to favor short-term debt.  The access to international equity markets seems to lead
                                               
5 It is interesting to note that Schmukler and Vesperoni (1999) obtain a similar result in their sample of Latin
American countries but not in their East Asian sample.29
to a larger share of long-term debt, possibly through the signaling mechanisms mentioned
above.
As to the effect of the macro financial variables, we find that the size and activity of
the banking sector is significantly associated with a longer maturity of debt in the firms’
balance sheet.  Given that firms are better able to finance long-term projects when they can
obtain an equally-matched debt maturity, this result implies that banking development may
lead firms to undertake long-term investment projects, such as those in infrastructure and
technological innovation, with arguably important productivity gains (see Levine 1997.)
To study the effect of capital markets on debt maturity, we use the size and activity of the
bond market (instead of the stock market, which is most relevant for questions on equity
ratios, as in the previous model.)  The size of the bond market, measured by its
capitalization relative to GDP, is not statistically related to the long-term to total debt ratio.
On the other hand, the activity of the bond market, measured by its traded value relative to
GDP, has a significant coefficient but of a surprisingly negative sign. This result may imply
that the liquidity of the bond market carries a positive externality on the development of
short-term debt markets. Finally, the financial liberalization index does not seem to affect
the ratio of long-term to total debt.  Following the argument provided above, this result
might be explained by the fact that the financial liberalization index mostly reflects
developments in the stock market, which is not directly relevant to the firms’ debt maturity.
C. Firm Growth
The third issue we would like to study concerns the growth rate of the firm,
measured by the proportional increase in the firm’s operational revenue.  We would like to
study the extent to which firm-specific and macro financial market developments have
impacted on the growth rate of our sample of firms.
The specification of the growth regression has been motivated by corporate finance
theory and also by analogy with the macro growth literature.  As in the previous models, it
considers both firm-specific and macro variables.  The basic firm growth regression is the
following,
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where RGr is the annual growth rate of the firm’s revenues. Ro is the initial (lagged) level
of revenues and is included to capture convergence effects to the firm’s steady-state size.
I/R is firm’s investment as ratio to revenues.  Fin and NoP are dummy variables for
whether the firm is, respectively, a financial or a non-profit firm; they are included to
account for a potentially different growth behavior in these types of firms.  D/E is the initial
debt-to-equity ratio and serves to control for principal/agent effects on firm growth.
GDPgr is the annual growth rate of GDP and is included to account for both the business
cycle and overall market expansion.  MFin is a vector of variables representing macro
financial outcome or policy variables. The regression residual is represented by e.
All explanatory variables are treated as weakly endogenous, except the macro
variables, which are exogenous.  We ignore unobserved firm-specific effects in the growth
regression because, as we discuss below, there is no indication of persistent residual serial
correlation in the regression in levels.  In fact, the error term appears to be serially
uncorrelated. Thus, although we also present a simple pooled OLS estimator, we focus on
the results obtained with the GMM estimator applied to the regression in levels.  This
choice is supported by the Sargan and serial-correlation specification tests.
Table 3.7 presents the results on firm’s growth.  The significantly negative sign of
the firm’s initial size reveals a convergence effect; that is, as the firm gets larger, its rate of
growth slows down, ceteris paribus.  Not surprisingly, the investment rate has a positive
effect on the growth of firm’s revenues.  Financial firms do not appear to grow differently
from the rest, while non-profit firms have a poorer growth performance even accounting for
the investment rate.  The debt-to-equity ratio does not significantly affect firm’s growth;
this suggests that if principal/agent considerations affect the growth of the firm, they would
have to do it through its investment rate.  Lastly for the control variables, the GDP growth
rate has a positive and significant effect on the growth rate of the firm.  The fact that the
coefficient on GDP growth rate appears to be larger than one indicates that, in average over
the whole period, the firms in the sample grew faster than the rest of the Chilean economy.
Regarding the macro financial variables, the size and activity of the banking sector
seem to have a positive impact on the growth rate of the firms.  However, the size and
activity of the stock market, as well as the related financial liberalization index, have a
surprisingly negative effect on growth.  A casual interpretation of these results would say31
that the development of the banking sector is more relevant than that of the stock market for
the growth of the firm.  However, the evidence does not warrant this conclusion.  In fact, it
is likely that this result is derived from the particular composition of our sample of firms
and, thus, cannot be extended to the rest.  In our empirical exercises we only used the firms
that have complete data for the period 1985-95.  Therefore, we do not include the
“younger” firms, which are likely to have experienced a quick rate of growth in the 1990s,
the period of fast expansion of the stock market.  As Table 3.1 indicates, our firms grew at
the impressive annual rate of 9.1% in the late 1980s, while in the 1990s their pace of
growth slowed down considerably (to 1.8%.)   Therefore, for our sample of firms, the
expansion and increased activity of the stock market seems to have served for consolidation
rather than for growth.
4. CONCLUSION
In the last 15 years Chile has experienced a remarkable development in its financial
system.  In our view, this is the happy outcome of the union between the market-oriented
policies started in the mid-1970s and the proper regulatory framework implemented in the
1980s.
From the analysis of the size, activity, and efficiency of the different financial
sectors and markets, we reach two basic conclusions:
• The banking sector experienced a significant development, quick but with reversals in
the 1970s and most of the 1980s and gradual in the 1990s.  In fact, the banking sector in
Chile surpassed the world average in the 1980s and has not fallen below it since then.
The stock and other capital markets also experienced improvement, moderate in the
1980s and remarkable in the 1990s.  Despite this improvement, the stock market in
Chile has not yet reached the world average.
• The composition (structure) of the financial system in Chile also experienced a
noteworthy change. The shift in the financial structure of the economy has occurred in a
way such that the stock and other capital markets have gained importance relative to the
banking sector.  This trend started in the 1970s and has accelerated in the late 1980s and
1990s. The shift in financial structure may be the result of an adjustment from an initial
situation in which the non-banking sector was too small for the level of development of32
the Chilean economy.  In this sense, the change in the financial structure in Chile is
analogous to a stock-adjustment process –the economy “accumulates” the financial
institutions of relative scarcity.  Therefore, it is likely that the increasing relative
importance of non-banking institutions tapers off in the future.
The analytical objective of this paper is to examine how these developments in the
Chilean financial system have affected the performance and behavior of firms.
Specifically, the paper analyzes for a sample of Chilean firms their access to financial
markets for investment purposes, their financing (balance-sheet) decisions and
corresponding financial structure, and their growth performance.  We work with a sample
of 79 firms that are quoted in the stock market and for which annual balance-sheet data for
the period 1985-95 are available and complete.  We now summarize the main conclusions
of the analytical section of the paper.
• In the second half of the 1980s, that is prior to the second wave of financial
liberalization, firm investment did not significantly depend on the firm's q-value but
was driven positively by the firm's cash flow and negatively by its level of
indebtedness. We can conclude that firms in this period faced important constraints on
external finance.
• In the 1990s, the period of largest financial development at the macro level, firm
investment has been less financially constrained than in the 1980s.  That is, in the 1990s
firm investment has been more responsive to changes in Tobin's q, less tied to internal
cash flow, and less affected by the debt-to-capital ratio.  Though qualitatively common
to all samples considered, these results are larger and more significant in the sample of
PFMC-grade firms.  Of the three indications of better access to financial markets, those
related to the effects of q-value and cash flow are the strongest and most robust across
samples.
• Regarding the effect of macro financial variables on the financial structure of the firms
in the sample, we conclude that, first, a larger size and activity of the banking sector
lead firms to prefer debt over equity and to enlarge the maturity of their debt obligations
in their balance sheet.  Second, a larger size and activity of the stock market induce
firms to expand equity relative to debt.  And, third, a larger activity of the bond market33
induces firms to reduce the maturity of their debt obligations.  Though somewhat
surprising, this result can be explained by the beneficial externality of bond market
liquidity on the market for short-term debt.
• The firm’s access to international equity markets appears to increase the debt-to-equity
ratio of the firm and to enlarge the maturity of its debt.  The first result may seem rather
puzzling.  It can be explained, however, considering that the ability to issue ADRs has a
positive signaling effect on the firm’s overall creditworthiness.  This effect might
decrease the costs of indebtedness sufficiently to overcome the direct equity-promoting
effect of issuing ADRs.
• Regarding the effect of macro financial variables on the firm’s revenue growth, the size
and activity of the banking sector seem to have a positive impact on the growth rate of
the firm.  However, the size and activity of the stock market, as well as the related
financial liberalization index, have a surprisingly negative effect on growth.  These
results should not be taken to imply that the development of the banking sector is more
relevant than that of the stock market for the growth of the firm.  In fact, it is likely that
this result is derived from the particular composition of our sample of firms, which does
not include the young, fastest growing firms in the 1990s.34
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Annex 1: Data Sources and Definitions
Balance-sheet data are taken from FECUS (acronyms for Ficha Estadística
Codificada Uniforme). The FECUS are available at the Superintendencia de Sociedades
Anónimas and contain the full firm’s balance sheet in a comparable base for the 1985-1995
period. The submission of the information collected in FECUS is legally mandated for the
corporations, (Sociedades Anónimas.) The variables constructed using this source are
presented in the next table.
Variables
Debt to Equity Ratio Long Term to Total Debt Ratio
Sales Growth Rate Fixed Assets to Total Assets Ratio
Profits to Total Assets Ratio
Data on the market value of the firm’s equity is obtained from Bolsa de Comercio
de Santiago (various issues). This publication summarizes the annual activity of the
Santiago Stock Market.
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6 Stocks are measured at the end of period  t.39
d= Depreciation
p=Annual Inflation (December to December)
 S= Sales Level
P= Price Level.
With respect to some firm’s characteristics, we use the dummy variables defined
below.
Variable Description
PFMC Grade Firm is eligible for investment by Pension Funds Managment
Companies
Conglomerate Firm is part of an economic conglomerate of firms
Non-Profit Firm supplies a product without a clear profit motive (like
schools, hospitals, and clubs, among others).
Financial The firm’s business is related to a financial activity
Access to International
Equity Market
The firm’s equity is traded in an international stock market
Finally, the macro-financial variables are constructed using the definitions shown in
Section 2:
Variable Description
Bank Market Size Total Bank Assets to GDP
Stock Market Size Stock Market Capitalization to GDP
Bond Market Size Total Bonds Stock to GDP
Bank Market Activity Private Credit by Banks to GDP
Stock Market Size Traded Value in the Stock Market to GDP
Bond Market Size Traded Value in the Bond Market to GDP
Financial Liberalization Index constructed by Bandiera et al. (1998)
GDP Growth Annual GDP Growth RateTable 3.1
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Sample Mean  Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Investment/ Full-Sample 0,133 0,231 -0,888 2,297
Capital Stock 1986-1990 0,140 0,239 -0,718 2,297
1991-1995 0,126 0,222 -0,888 2,012
AFP-Grade 0,148 0,212 -0,616 2,297
Total Debt / Full-Sample 0,576 1,170 0,000 17,851
Equity 1986-1990 0,720 1,564 0,000 17,851
1991-1995 0,433 0,505 0,000 3,905
Long Term / Full-Sample 0,351 0,288 0,000 0,985
Total Debt 1986-1990 0,348 0,290 0,000 0,985
1991-1995 0,353 0,285 0,000 0,956
Sales Growth Full-Sample 0,054 0,371 -2,693 4,749
1986-1990 0,091 0,406 -2,652 4,749
1991-1995 0,018 0,329 -2,693 1,592Table 3.2
Firm Investment and Financing Constraints: Effects by Types of Firms
Dependent Variable: Investment/Capital Stock
(t-Statistics are presented below their corresponding coefficients)
                AFP Grade        Conglomerate Member
Estimation Technique: OLS-Level GMM-Level OLS-Level GMM-Level
Instruments: Levels Levels 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Constant 0,084320 0,079072 0,077451 0,080707
6,248834 10,577237 5,102972 11,820685
q -0,008546 -0,013227 0,008387 0,008395
-0,677185 -2,556850 0,643076 1,270587
q* PFMC Grade 0,065599 0,080109
2,478883 7,917540
q * conglomerate member 0,000710 0,020966
0,027091 1,193651
Initial Cash Flow/Capital Stock 0,371588 0,427430 0,346920 0,375982
5,961716 26,474843 6,485787 14,638472
Initial Cash Flow/Capital Stock -0,123901 -0,020158
*PFMC Grade -1,311623 -8,713207
Initial Cash Flow/Capital Stock -0,007207 -0,053956
* conglomerate member -0,056777 -1,181334
Initial Debt/Capital Stock -0,038291 -0,036993 -0,047281 -0,046551
-3,140048 -7,354128 -3,450214 -6,256173
Initial Debt/Capital Stock -0,009238 0,006170
* PFMC Grade -0,376107 0,655535
Initial Debt/Capital Stock 0,052976 0,038713
* conglomerate member 1,452392 2,540249
No. Firms 79 79 79 79
No. Observations 790 790 790 790
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)
 (a) Sargan Test 0,479 0,169
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0,001 0,000 0,001 0,001
       Second-Order 0,932 0,860 0,921 0,794
       Third-Order 0,687 0,821 0,629 0,779Table 3.3
Firm Investment and Financing Constraints: The 90's Effect
Dependent Variable: Investment/Capital Stock
(t-Statistics are presented below their corresponding coefficients)
                       All               PFMC Grade
Estimation Technique: OLS-Level GMM-Level OLS-Level GMM-Level OLS-Level GMM-Level
Instruments: Levels Levels  Levels
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [¨6]
Constant 0,081045 0,068921 0,080790 0,073246 0,115830 0,110677
6,072926 6,397630 4,367407 5,222226 5,862451 8,152031
q 0,001764 -0,009892 0,060722 0,041516 0,000051 -0,004903
0,110140 -0,728704 1,377322 1,062130 0,001308 -0,196978
q * D90 0,016364 0,017056 0,026147 0,061941 0,470010 0,086643
1,006880 1,491248 0,511305 1,591439 0,989647 3,660411
Initial Cash Flow/Capital Stock 0,399097 0,445828 0,398209 0,471556 0,420232 0,471530
7,641838 10,911405 4,905757 9,769294 3,293167 4,185704
Initial Cash Flow/Capital Stock -0,117827 -0,176207 -0,364000 -0,486296 -0,339486 -0,460838
* D90 -1,335149 -3,617454 -3,460842 -9,663873 -2,128480 -4,218490
Initial Debt/Capital Stock -0,047560 -0,032118 -0,081615 -0,066910 -0,054235 -0,069114
-4,173719 -2,377987 -3,949663 -4,148956 -2,236373 -2,919854
Initial Debt/Capital Stock 0,014205 0,018089 0,066718 0,075926 0,035708 0,036420
* D90 0,390563 0,802480 1,465413 3,203625 0,662776 1,014928
No. Firms 79 79 40 40 36 36
No. Observations 790 790 400 400 360 360
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)
 (a) Sargan Test 0,539 0,627 0,489
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0,001 0,001 0,003 0,000 0,121 0,024
       Second-Order 0,797 0,765 0,816 0,834 0,146 0,230
       Third-Order 0,707 0,770 0,227 0,254 0,409 0,490
       Conglomerate MemberTable 3.4
Firm Investment and Financing Constraints: Macro-Financial Effects
Dependent Variable: Investment/Capital Stock
(t-Statistics are presented below their corresponding coefficients)
Estimation Technique: GMM-Level GMM-Level GMM-Level
Instruments: Levels Levels  Levels 
[1] [2] [3]
Constant 0,063368 0,060834 -0,333860
0,979636 0,810943 -0,282541
q -0,010837 -0,008789 -0,011043
-0,829551 -0,675126 -0,791393
q * D90 0,018668 0,017983 0,019227
1,703700 1,573458 1,646959
Initial Cash Flow/Capital Stock 0,456415 0,451047 0,456488
10,660383 10,661263 10,377318
Initial Cash Flow/Capital Stock -0,182449 -0,179435 -0,193872
* D90 -3,615203 -3,494691 -3,343107
Initial Debt/Capital Stock -0,028415 -0,030677 -0,029943
-2,073560 -2,221590 -2,106887
Initial Debt/Capital Stock 0,004377 0,010067 0,007928
* D90 0,231233 0,484364 0,380484
Bank assets/GDP -0,016150
-0,120481
Stock market capitalization/GDP 0,025589
1,048645
Private Credit by Banks/GDP 0,009077
0,049324
Stock Market Traded Value/GDP 0,917250
0,604797
Financial Liberalization Index 0,110750
0,916467
No. Firms 79 79 79
No. Observations 790 790 790
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)
 (a) Sargan Test 0,498 0,520 0,513
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0,001 0,001 0,001
       Second-Order 0,783 0,770 0,775
       Third-Order 0,772 0,821 0,764Table 3.5
Financial Structure -Ratio of Debt to Equity: Firm and Macro-Financial Efects
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Debt to Equity
(t-Statistics are presented below their corresponding coefficients)
Estimation Technique: OLS-Level GMM-Levels GMM-System GMM-System GMM-System
Instruments: Levels and Diff. Levels and Diff. Levels and Diff.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Constant -0,681175 -0,782761 1,482724 2,595548 3,901842
-0,772862 -2,464917 5,019774 9,168479 13,190393
ln (Capital Stock) -0,020347 0,017522 -0,117542 -0,192560 -0,116886
-0,504099 0,96995 -7,03815 -10,381302 -8,709620
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 0,151021 0,201798 -0,235659 -0,477531 -0,076201
0,562319 2,114521 -2,19253 -3,690840 -0,665794
Profits/Total Assets 0,909931 1,100983 -0,032468 0,171888 -0,792670
1,216323 3,210347 -0,174129 0,951840 -4,500945
Acces to International Equity  -0,015454 0,034440 0,186109 0,218406 0,183650
Markets -0,146249 0,497211 2,072695 1,714409 2,419845
Bank assets/GDP 3,527226 1,801320 2,365871
2,098321 5,221858 10,148994
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP -0,330354 -0,155834 -0,110151
-2,232143 -2,767271 -3,035003
Private Credit by Banks/GDP 3,016378
13,330112
Stock Market Traded Value/GDP -0,527869
-3,983729
Financial Liberalization Index -1,476938
-11,574798
No. Firms 71 71 71 71 71
No. Observations 710 710 710 710 710
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)
 (a) Sargan Test 0,255 0,286 0,242 0,220
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0,016 0,013 0,300 0,297 0,296
       Second-Order 0,022 0,016 0,383 0,370 0,374
       Third-Order 0,017 0,013 0,258 0,255 0,243Table 3.6
Financial Structure - Ratio of Long-Term to Total Debt : Firm and Macro-Financial Effects
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Long Term to Total Debt
(t-Statistics are presented below their corresponding coefficients)
Estimation Technique: OLS-Level GMM-Levels GMM-System GMM-System GMM-System
Instruments: Levels and Diff. Levels and Diff. Levels and Diff.
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Constant -0,800148 -0,64167 -0,068553 0,015301 0,269479
-3,410032 -3,699624 -0,342582 0,101586 1,543398
ln (Capital Stock) 0,052568 0,045538 0,013657 0,007229 -0,003089
4,247018 4,765438 1,242716 1,559453 -0,279394
Fixed Assets/Total Assets 0,210687 0,255605 0,212734 0,267626 0,242264
2,313560 3,302754 2,072683 2,789455 2,442140
Profits/Total Assets -0,026982 0,005738 -0,263798 -0,357727 -0,350749
-0,107308 0,024518 -2,24139 -3,267479 -3,488995
Acces to International Equity  0,080378 0,133377 0,253841 0,243284 0,287906
Markets 1,413031 2,878475 6,735818 7,457619 6,823780
Bank assets/GDP 0,709564 0,494192 0,255012
3,569008 3,716906 2,849467
Bond Capitalization/GDP -0,635398 -0,542400 -0,113401
-2,114252 -4,083321 -1,014588
Private Credit by Banks/GDP 0,149978
1,597504
Bond market Traded Value/GDP -0,299782
-3,701428
Financial Liberalization Index 0,024540
0,055879
No. Firms 71 71 71 71 71
No. Observations 710 710 710 710 710
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)
 (a) Sargan Test 0,04 0,488 0,505 0,450
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0,000 0,000 0,007 0,009 0,012
       Second-Order 0,000 0,000 0,421 0,431 0,449
       Third-Order 0,000 0,000 0,546 0,556 0,481Table 3.7
Firm Growth: Firm and Macro-Financial Effects
Dependent Variable: Revenue Growth 
(t-Statistics are presented below their corresponding coefficients)
Estimation Technique: OLS-Levels GMM-Level GMM-Level GMM-Level
Instruments: Levels Levels Levels
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Constant -0,235681 -0,316457 -0,417794 0,787047
-1,137275 -9,806795 -5,103201 6,136354
Initial Real Level of Revenues -0,012360 -0,006543 -0,011038 -0,008529
-0,893143 -3,444856 -2,212130 -1,778931
Investment/Sales 0,008267 0,010831 0,005379 0,005025
1,215774 95,80607 6,880249 7,061981
Financial Firm 0,142922 0,230129 0,553800 0,551898
4,015683 0,897524 0,068559 0,70026
Non-Profit Firm -0,071347 -0,041766 -0,088623 -0,078006
-1,017987 -1,846794 -2,127454 -1,855455
Total Debt/Total Equity 0,000151 0,005213 0,015554 0,091118
-0,018985 1,331959 1,362413 0,866416
G.D.P. Growth 1,435333 1,481116 1,592927 1,221395
2,465805 21,353825 5,806864 4,641959
Banks Assets/GDP 0,954565 0,917993
2,487138 21,87407
Stock Market Capitalization/GDP -0,124338 -0,117355
-3,594684 -20,241156
Private Credit by Banks/GDP 1,410610
9,268829
Stock Market Traded Value/GDP -1,051936
-6,906845
Financial Liberalization Index -0,727749
-11,188487
No. Firms 66 66 66 66
No. Observations 660 660 660 660
SPECIFICATION TESTS (P-Values)
 (a) Sargan Test 0,162 0,555 0,535
 (b) Serial Correlation :
       First-Order 0,470 0,417 0,567 0,477
       Second-Order 0,542 0,435 0,699 0,406
       Third-Order 0,212 0,186 0,24 0,181